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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEN ARNOVITZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN LEWIS TELLA, 




STA'fEl\IENT O~_, KIND OF CASE 
Appellant commenced this action seeking to recover 
for property damage and personal injuries suffered in 
an automobile collision involving Appellant and Re-
spondent, and Respondent counterclaimed for damages 
to his automobile. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried below to the Court sitting with-
out a jury. The Court rendered judgment in favor of the 
1 
Respondent and against the Appellant for no cause of 
action on Appellant's Complaint, and in favor of Re-
spondent and against Appellant on Respondent's Coun-
terclaim in the sum of $500.00 with interest at 6 percent 
from June 8, 1970, until date of judgment, and there-
after at 8 percent per annum until satisfied, plus costs of 
$18.10. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Court's judg-
ment in its entirity. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with Appellant as to the time 
and place of the collision as outlined in Appellant's Brief, 
and agrees that two separate and distinct collisions oc-
curred involving the two parties. 
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's statements 
as to the relative severity of the two collisions and the 
amount of damages directly attributable to each. It is 
Respondent's view of the facts, apparently accepted by 
the lower Court, that the first collision, in which Appel-
lant's vehicle struck Respondent's vehicle from the rear, 
was sufficiently severe to break the carburetor control 
mechanism governing the acceleration of Respondent's 
vehicle, and tear the front seat of Respondent's vehicle 
2 
from the floorboard. Either by the jolt of the collision 
itself, or by the involuntary movement of Respondent as 
he was thrust backwards by the jolt and the breaking of 
the seat, the automatic transmission shift leaver was 
forced into reverse position. This, along with the fact 
that Respondent's vevhicle was now racing "wide open," 
resulted in the second collision, in which Respondent's 




WHERE THERE IS A CONFLICT IN 
THE EVIDENCE, THE REVIEWING COURT 
l\iUST VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PRE-
VAILING PARTY. 
Appellant's Points II, III, IV, and Vall go to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. It is not seriously disputed 
that the first collision was caused by Appellant's ve-
hicle running into the rear of Respondent's vehicle. Re-
spondent testified that this initial impact broke the seat 
of his vehicle loose from the floor and forced the vehicle's 
gear shift leaver into the reverse position, which caused 
the second impact. (Tr. 83) Respondent also testified 
that he had no intention of backing his vehicle into that 
of Appellant, and no intention whatsoever of harming 
Appellant. (Tr. 87) 
3 
Respondent's version was supported by the testi-
mony of Officer Mower, the investigating officer who 
inspected the Respondent's vehicle at the scene and testi-
fied that the front seat was loose from the floor and that 
the vehicle's accelerator "was stuck wide open." ( 'l'r. 
101) 
Appellant's witnesses testified that Respondent 
backed rapidly (Tr. 8, 23, and 37), that his engine was 
racing (Tr. 10, 29, and 48), and that the two collisions 
were almost simultaneous (Tr. 40, 52, and 53). Such 
testimony is supportive of Respondent's version of the 
cause of the second collision, which certainly seems more 
reasonable than Appellant's allegations that the Re-
spondent deliberately and maliciously backed his ve-
hicle at a rapid rate of speed into Appellant's vehicle, 
thus exposing himself to serious injury. 
In short, there is at best a conflict in the evidence. 
The Appellant asks the Court to believe his version of 
the facts rather than Respondent's version, which the 
Court is not obligated to do. 
Prior Utah cases make it clear that the reviewing 
Court must review the evidence and whatever reason-
able inferences can be drawn therefrom, in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, and not in the light 
most favorable to the Appellant as Appellant asks. Pol-
lick vs. J. C. Penny, 24 Utah 2nd 405, 473 P 2nd 394 
(1970); Brigham vs. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 
2nd 292, 470 P 2nd 393 ( 1970); Howe vs. Jackson, 18 
Utah 2nd 269, 421 P 2nd 159 (1966). 
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The same general rule would also apply regarding 
the amount of damages awarded by the Court which 
Appellant claims was an erroneous award. Respondent 
testified that his vehicle was worth $600.00 to $650.00, 
and that he had priced similar vehicles on the open mar-
ket and found that they were selling for $450.00 to 
$700.00 (Tr. 88). Respondent also introduced into evi-
dence two editions of a local newspaper, dated near the 
time of the collision, each containing therein a classified 
advertisement for a vehicle of the same model and year. 
The advertised prices of these vehicles were $400.00 and 
$700.00 (Tr. 88 and 89). Respondent also testified that 
the car was "totaled out." (Tr. 89). 
There was no testimony introduced rebutting the 
value of the car. Under these circumstances, where the 
Court found that the car was "totaled" it was obligated 
to accept Respondent's evidence as to the value, as there 
was no other evidence before it. 
POINT II 
A JUDG~IENT SHOULD NOT BE RE-
VERSED ON APPEAL UNLESS THERE IS 
ERROR OF SUCH SUBSTANTIAL NATURE 
THAT THERE IS LIKELIHOOD THAT THE 
RESULT WOULD HA VE BEEN DIFFERENT 
IN ITS ABSENCE. 
Respondent admits that the weight of authority in 
this jurisdiction apparently allows witnesses to testify 
concerning the visible emotions and demeanor of others 
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in certain instances as claimed by Appellant in Point I 
of his Brief on appeal. Respondent does not believe that 
the Court erred in excluding the testimony it did in this 
case, and contends that even if it were error, it was not 
substantial or prejudicial and therefore was not revers-
ible error. 
Appellant cited Fritz vs. Western Union Telegraph 
Company, 25 Utah 263, 71 P 209 (1903), and In Re 
Miller's Estate, 36 Utah 228, 102 P 996 (1909) to sup-
port his allegation that reversible error was committed. 
It should be noted that in both of these cases, the witness 
was well acquainted with the person his testimony con-
cerned, and the foundation laid in both cases showed that 
the witness was qualified to make such a judgment based 
upon his familiarity with the individual and his oppor-
tunity to observe such emotion. The law in Utah is to 
the effect that a trial judge has a reasonable right of 
discretion as to how far afield examination of witnesses 
may be pursued, and his rulings should not be disturbed 
unless it clearly appears that he was in error in his judg-
ment or that he abused his discretion. In Re Baxter's 
Estate, 16 Utah 2nd 284, 399 P 2nd 422, 17 ALR 3rd 
700 (1965). 
In the case at hand, the two witnesses questioned as 
to the emotion exhibited by Respondent were apparent 
strangers to him, and had apparently never seen him be-
fore. Their observations were made while riding in and 
driving an automobile (Tr. 7 and 23) located across the 
intersection from Respondent who was also in an auto-
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mobile. The observation of each lasted only a few sec-
onds, as both admitted they did not see the first collision 
(Tr. 18 and Tr. 34 lines 25 through 27), and both wit-
nesses were somewhat unsure of just what type of emo-
tion Respondent exhibited. 
Mr. Jensen testified that Respondent "appeared to 
be quite disturbed and angry about something," and that 
"he had-well, he looked like he was disturbed." (Tr. 7) 
A "disturbed" look is not at all out of harmony with Re-
spondent's testimony. Mr. Jensen testified as follows 
(Tr. 33 and 34) 
Q You don't know~· Did he have his arm up on 
the back of the seat lo king over his left shoulder? 
Or did he just have his head turned? 
A Well, I don't know. 
Q You don't know? You didn't observe that? 
Could you clearly see his face? 
A No. 
Q You couldn't clearly see his face? 
A I don't remember, except that-
Q Well, you answered my question. You don't 
remember. 
A I guess. 
THE COURT: Except that maybe she is not 
saying that. Finish your answer, please. 
THE \VITNESS: \Vell, I saw his face. 
Q (By ~Ir. :Moffat) Could you clearly see his 
face? 
A I think so. 
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Q And this was with him looking over the left 
shoulder and you at the intersection of Second 
South? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Before you made the turn? 
A Uh huh. 
Appellant's other witness testified that Respondent 
looked over his right shoulder (Tr. 37), which would in-
dicate that his head was turned away from the Jensen 
vehicle. 
Without more of a foundation, the Court was cor-
rect in not allowing the witnesses to testify as to the emo-
tional state of Respondent. The Court did allow the wit-
nesses to testify as to what they observed (Tr. 11 and 
29), which under the circumstances, was all that the wit-
nesses could reliably testify to. 
Our case would seem to be nearer the situation in 
Weaver vs. State, l Ala App 48, 55 So. 956 ( 1911), than 
the cases cited by the Appellant. In the Weaver case, the 
Court said 
The question asked the witness Levi, "Was the 
deceased at the time quarrelsome," or "in a quar-
relsome mood during the seven minutes immedi-
ately preceding the shooting?" sought to elicit the 
opinion of the witness, and the facts from which 
the jury, as was its province, and not that of the 
witness, draw such a conclusion, and the State's 
objections to such questions were properly sus-
tained. 
In denying an application for the rehearing of this case 
in 2 Ala App 98, 56 So. 749 (1911) it was said 
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The questions in point here call for more than a 
mere shorthand rendering of facts, or such an 
opinion as witness may give under the recognized 
exceptions to the general rule against the per-
missibility of opinion evidence; these questions 
call for the mental status, the mood in which the 
deceased was, extending over a period of seven 
minute's time. How he evidenced such a quarrel-
some mood during that length of time was cer-
tainly susceptible of narration. 
It should be pointed out that the instant case was 
tried before the Court sitting without a jury, whereas, 
both cases cited by Appellant in support of the claimed 
error, were tried before a jury. The judge's rulings on 
evidence are not as critical in a trial to a Court sitting 
without a jury, since a trial judge will include in his con-
sideration of the issues his knowledge as to the compe-
tency, materiality and effect of the evidence. In Re 
Baxter's Estate, supra; Sweeny vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 
18 Utah 2nd 113, 417P2nd126 (1966). 
Even should the Court determine that error was 
committed, it is Respondent's position that it was not re-
versible error in this case. The record shows that the 
Court was advised that the witnesses believed Respond-
ent was angry, so that issue was before the Court. The 
following testimony was made without objection. (Tr. 7) 
A ... And what attracted my attention was Mr. 
Tella, or the one-the driver-the defendant was 
looking over his shoulder at the car behind him 
and leaning back over his seat looking back at-
behind him, and I just couldn't figure what he 
was looking for. But I watched him for a minute, 
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and all at once I noticed that he-well, he ap-
peared to be quite disturbed and angry about 
something. I don't know. 
Q Proceed with your testimony. 
A He had-well, he looked like he was dis-
turbed. 
Therefore, the testimony Appellant later tried to 
elicit from the witnesses would only be cumulative, and 
its exclusion would not be so prejudicial as to be revers-
ible. Also, the vantage point of the witnesses' observation 
and their uncertainty as to what they saw, as explained 
above, would limit the value of their testimony on this 
point. Prior Utah cases make it clear that the reversal of 
a judgment is justified only when there is some error of 
such substantial nature that there is likelihood that the 
result would have been different in its absence. Eager vs. 
'Villis, 17 Utah 2nd 314, 410 P 2nd 1003 ( 1966); In Re 
Baxter's Estate, supra. Rule 5 of the Rules of Eivdence 
as adopted by this Court states the rule as follows 
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor 
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be 
reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the 
proponent of the evidence either made known the 
substance of the evidence in a form and by a 
method approved by the judge, or indicated the 
substance of the expected evidence by questions 
indicating the desired answers, and (b) the Court 
which passes upon the effect of the error or errors 
is of the opinion that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict or finding. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent maiutains that the trial court was cor-
rect in its ruling because: 
I. There is at least a conflict of the evidence as to 
the negligence and contributory negligence of the parties 
involved, and there is substantial evidence supporting 
the Findings of Fact of the trial court. This Court must 
view the evidence in light most favorable to Respondent's 
position. 
2. The Court rightfully exercised its discretion in 
excluding certain testimony of Appellant's witnesses, 
which action was not error. Even if error were com-
mitted, it was not so prejudicial or substantial as to be 
reversible error where the case was tried by the judge 
without a jury, where the testimony would have been 
cumulative had it been introduced, and where the cir-
cumstances were such that any conclusions the witnesses 
might have reached regarding Respondent's emotional 
state would have been extremely speculative. 
'VHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully prays 
that the action of the trial court be affirmed. 
J\IIOFFAT, 'VELLING, TAYLOR 
and PAULSEN 
Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys for Respondent 
9th Floor Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
11 
